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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, for purposes of issuer liability under Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77k, a
statement in a registration statement attempting to
characterize a verifiable, present fact about the legal
validity of contracts as a “belief ” rather than a fact
can shield an issuer from liability.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are scholars at American law and business
schools whose research and teaching focus on federal
securities regulation and the governance of public
corporations. Two of the four authors appearing as
counsel on this brief have together submitted to this
Court briefs on prior occasions as amici in cases arising under the federal securities laws on behalf of law
and business faculty.2 Amici have an interest in ensuring a proper interpretation of the statutory framework put in place by Congress under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §77k. Amici
have no financial stake in the outcome of this litigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------1

This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by counsel for either party, and no person other than amici and their
academic institutions contributed monetarily to the preparation
or submission of this brief. None of the schools that employ
amici are a signatory to this brief, and the views expressed here
are not affiliated with those institutions. This amicus brief is
filed pursuant to the blanket consent executed by both parties
and filed with this Court (by Respondents and Petitioners on
March 28, 2014).
2
Two of the four authors on this brief also submitted
amicus briefs on behalf of law and business faculty in Merck &
Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010) and in Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). See Br. of Amici Curiae Faculty at Law and Business Schools in Support of Resp’ts,
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, No. 08-905, Oct. 26, 2009; Br. for
Professors at Law and Business Schools as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Resp’ts, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, No.
09-1156, Nov. 12, 2010.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This is a garden-variety action alleging false
disclosure that requires nothing more than application of settled principles under the federal securities
laws. The statement at issue is one of present material fact, not opinion. Falsity is established, as Respondents have alleged, through evidence showing
that the statement at issue was incorrect on the date
made.
Respondents seek to recover under Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77k (“1933
Act”), for alleged misstatements of material fact made
by Petitioners. The provision makes actionable a misstatement or omission of a material fact in an effective registration statement. 15 U.S.C. §77k(a). To
establish a prima facie case, a purchaser of the securities subject to the registration statement “need
only show a material misstatement or omission. . . .”
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382
(1983).
Respondents have met this standard. Petitioners
represented in the registration statement that “[w]e
believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers are legally and economically valid arrangements that bring value to the healthcare system
and the patients that we serve.” Second Am. Complaint (“Complaint”) ¶46. The Complaint asserts that
the statement was materially false and misleading
“when made.” Id. at ¶47. The Complaint includes
a number of allegations, which, when taken as true,

3
demonstrate that the contracts were not legally valid
at the time of the statement. See id. at ¶47-90. The
Sixth Circuit found these allegations sufficient to
demonstrate falsity. See Ind. State Dist. Council v.
Omnicare, Inc., 719 F.3d 498, 505-07 (6th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1490 (2014).
Petitioners, however, contend that the statement
should be characterized as an “opinion.” Relying on
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083
(1991), they assert that the falsity of an opinion can
only be shown through evidence of subjective disbelief. We disagree with this characterization of the
statement at issue as an opinion. A representation
about the legal validity of contracts, like other matters of present fact, can be false on the date made. To
the extent, for example, that contracts are conduits
for illegal kickbacks, it will not always be necessary
for an issuer to obtain a court ruling or await future
developments to know that the contracts are invalid.
A speaker may, in some cases, express an opinion
or belief with respect to present facts. An opinion in
these circumstances conveys uncertainty or doubt as
to the accuracy of the representation. Where, however, the speaker possesses information establishing
the plain invalidity of the stated facts, the requisite
uncertainty does not exist. Nor does the issuer create
uncertainty by adding the words “[w]e believe” to the
statement.
Allowing an issuer to escape liability for untrue
statements of present fact in a registration statement

4
by treating them as beliefs or opinions contradicts the
statutory framework set out in, and policies underlying, Section 11. See 15 U.S.C. §77k. Under the provision, issuers are assigned unique responsibility for
ensuring the accuracy of a registration statement. Insiders and underwriters are permitted to avoid liability for a false representation where they “believe”
that the facts in the registration statement are accurate. See 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3) (providing that insiders
and underwriters can avoid liability where, “after reasonable investigation,” they had “reasonable ground
to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading”).
Issuers, in contrast, are held to a standard of
liability that is “virtually absolute. . . .” Herman &
MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. They are specifically denied the right to raise as a defense to a Section 11
claim alleging a misrepresentation or omission of
material fact that they “believe” otherwise. See 15
U.S.C. §77k(b) (due diligence defense applicable to
those “other than the issuer”). Issuers, therefore,
have additional incentive to verify the accuracy of
the registration statement.
Permitting a statement about the validity of contracts to be treated as a belief or opinion when the
issuer possesses information to the contrary fundamentally alters this regulatory scheme. If such

5
treatment is judicially validated, issuers will be able
to rely on a litigation strategy that Congress sought
to foreclose in denying issuers the right to resort to a
reasonable belief defense under Section 11. Moreover,
the approach effectively introduces into Section 11 a
state of mind requirement. Purchasers required to
establish a subjective disbelief as to present facts
will be obligated to present evidence similar to that
needed to demonstrate scienter.
To the extent, however, that this Court treats the
statements at issue as opinions, we do not agree that
the matter is “answered” by the decision in Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
See Pet’r’s Br. at 2. In Virginia Bankshares, this
Court “confine[d]” its analysis to statements of opinion by directors that were not subjectively believed.
501 U.S. at 1090. The Court did not, therefore, resolve the standard for showing the falsity of opinions
in the absence of allegations of subjective insincerity.
We agree with the Government that opinions
sincerely held may nonetheless be false if they lack a
reasonable basis, a longstanding and familiar test
widely used under the federal securities laws. Lower
courts and the common law also recognize that an
opinion may be false where the maker possesses undisclosed facts that contradict the accuracy of the
statement.
In this case, Respondents have alleged that Petitioners possessed facts demonstrating that the contracts referenced in its statement were invalid on the
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date the statement was made. This allegation, as the
Sixth Circuit found, is sufficient to allege falsity. To
the extent that Petitioners’ statement is treated as an
opinion, Respondents have alleged facts sufficient to
meet the pleading standards applicable in Section 11
actions.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
I.

The Representation in the Registration
Statement about the Legal Validity of Contracts Is a Statement of Present, Verifiable
Fact, the Falsity of Which can be Determined through the Use of Settled Principles of Law

According to the Complaint, Petitioners represented in the registration statement that “[w]e believe
that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers are legally and economically valid arrangements
that bring value to the healthcare system and the
patients that we serve.” Complaint ¶46. Petitioners
have characterized the statement as one of opinion
that can be “objectively erroneous. . . .”3 Pet’r’s Br. 18
3

An opinion may in some cases not be objectively verifiable
under any circumstances. See Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at
1090 (petitioners describing opinions at issue in that case as
“indefinite and unverifiable expressions”). See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts §538A (“A representation is one of opinion if
it expresses only . . . (b) his judgment as to quality, value,
authenticity, or other matters of judgment.”). In this case,
however, Petitioners recognize that a statement of legal validity
(Continued on following page)
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n. 4. They assert, however, that the statement at issue cannot be definitively true or false on the date
made “except in the rare case in which a court has
already definitively ruled on the legality of the issuer’s actions.” Pet’r’s Br. 35. Instead, “ultimate accuracy of the stated belief hinges on future events and
the decisions of judges, juries, and regulators.” Id.
It is true that contracts described as legally valid
today may be found to be invalid tomorrow. In some
cases, a basis for invalidity of a contract may be
4
known but unresolved. In other cases, validity may
depend upon unexpected but ultimately successful
challenges by “[c]reative counsel.” See Zucker v.
Andreessen, No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448, at *8
(Del. Ch. June 21, 2012). Sometimes the law will
change, causing a contract to no longer be valid. Indeed, these sorts of uncertainties are an inherent and
important attribute of the common law system, particularly with respect to corporate governance and
capital-raising. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Lisa L.
can be “objectively false.” See Pet’r’s Br. 27 (asserting that
statement must be “ ‘both objectively false and disbelieved by the
defendant at the time it was expressed.’ ”) (quoting Fait v.
Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011)).
4
We note, however, that where the speaker is aware of
existing challenges to the validity of contracts, even though
unresolved, a statement of legal validity may be materially incomplete under the antifraud provisions. See Meyer v. JinkoSolar
Holdings Co., No. 13-616-cv, 2014 WL 3747181, at *4 (2d Cir.
July 31, 2014) (“Even when there is no existing independent
duty to disclose information, once a company speaks on an issue
or topic, there is a duty to tell the whole truth.”).

8
Casey, Corporate Governance: Cases and Materials
733 (Lexis-Nexis 2012) (noting that common law
countries “are typically more comfortable with legal
requirements created by, or left to, the courts. The
likely effect of judicially created legal requirements is
that it can be changed more quickly, arguably providing both increased flexibility and increased uncertainty.”).
A statement of legal validity is not, however,
invariably dependent upon future events or a determination by a judge, jury, or regulator. A contract
may be plainly and well understood to be invalid in
the present. See Roberts v. Lanier, 72 So. 3d 1174,
1187-88 (Ala. 2011) (where it was “undisputed that
contractual provisions for non-refundable retainers
[were] unenforceable,” case allowed to go forward as
to whether certain defendants “misrepresented . . .
that the contract as written was valid and enforceable. . . .”).5
5

Requiring a definitive ruling from a court as a precondition for invalidity would preclude such a finding even where
a legal opinion stated otherwise. See Marilou M. King, Esq. &
Elizabeth S. Turqman, Esq., Year in Review, Seminar Materials,
Health Law Update and Annual Meeting, Dallas, TX, June 4,
1997, AHLA-PAPERS P06049705 (representing that “[a]fter entering into the contract, [the company] was advised by counsel
that the contract violated the federal Medicare Anti-Kickback
Statute”). The need for a court decision to show invalidity seeks
to impose the type of “bright-line” rule under the federal securities laws that this Court has twice rejected in other contexts. See
Matrixx Initiatives, 131 S. Ct. at 1319 (rejecting “categorical
rule” as test for materiality); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
(Continued on following page)

9
Contracts can, therefore, be invalid ab initio
where, for example, they lack mandatory formalities.
See First Am. Kickapoo Operations, L.L.C. v. Multimedia Games, Inc., 412 F.3d 1166, 1176 (10th Cir.
2005) (“Certain formalities . . . must take place before
an agreement becomes a contract. The regulations’
requirement that management contracts be approved
to be valid creates no ontological mystery whereby
a contract springs fully-fashioned from nothingness,
but rather identifies a formality necessary before an
agreement to manage a tribal gaming operation can
become a contract so to manage. Lacking the formality . . . an agreement to manage does not become a
contract: it is void.”).
Contracts that violate the terms of a statute may
be invalid. See Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. §78cc(b) (contracts made in violation of title
“shall be void”); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§774, cmt. a (“An agreement may be clearly illegal, as
when it is forbidden by statute.”).
Contracts that involve an illegal purpose may
also be invalid. See United States v. Mardirosian, 602
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (“It is well-established that
contracts for illegal purposes are void as a matter of
public policy. . . . We tread no new ground in declaring
that the act of demanding a fee for the return of
stolen property is unlawful.”).
U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (“We reject ‘agreement-in-principle as to
price and structure’ as the bright-line rule for materiality.”).

10
Contracts can be invalid as a result of violations
of the federal Anti-Kickback statute. The law prohibits remuneration in return for patient referrals or
in return for the purchase of goods, facilities, services or items paid for under a federal health care
program. See 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b); see also 42
C.F.R. §1001.952 (safe harbor for payments otherwise
subject to Anti-Kickback statute). Contracts cannot,
therefore, provide for payments that are inconsistent
with these provisions. See Nursing Home Consultants
v. Quantum Health Servs., 926 F. Supp. 835, 843-44
(E.D. Ark. 1996), aff ’d, 112 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 1997)
(marketing agreement “plainly falls within the literal
purview” of Anti-Kickback statute and “[p]lainly . . .
fails” to fall within safe harbor and, as a result, “is
illegal, and hence unenforceable, in that it contemplates a business arrangement that is prohibited by
§1320a-7b(b)(1), and which is not saved by the ‘safe
harbor’ regulations.”). An agreement that appears to
be valid on its face but is, in reality, a “sham” designed to mask prohibited payments is an unlawful
kickback arrangement. See Medicare and State
Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35952-01 (July 29,
1991) (“[S]ham contracts in which remuneration is
exchanged for property that does not exist or space
which is not used are among the most egregious
kickback arrangements.”). To the extent that contracts are conduits for illegal kickbacks, therefore, it
will not always be necessary for an issuer to always
obtain a court ruling or await future developments to
know that such agreements are invalid.

11
Courts interpreting the federal securities laws
have recognized that statements of legal validity or
compliance can be matters of present fact that may
be false when made. In Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP
v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2008), for
example, the court addressed allegations that defendants misrepresented in a merger agreement that
the company was “ ‘in compliance in all material respects with all laws’ ” and, specifically, that the company was “in compliance with the books and records
provision of Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act. . . .”
The court found that it was sufficient for plaintiff to
allege “facts demonstrating that [the company] was
not in compliance with Section 13(b) of the Exchange
Act at the time the warranties were made. . . .” Id. at
742 (emphasis in original); see also Reese v. Malone,
747 F.3d 557, 578 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Statements of
legal compliance are pled with adequate falsity when
documents detail specific violations of law that
existed at the time the warranties were made.”); In
re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 939
(D.N.J. 1998) (“[F]acts demonstrating [that the company] was not in compliance with the terms of the
Credit Agreement from the moment it was signed
would be important to a reasonable investor.”).6

6

Statements with respect to contracts can be misleading in
other respects. Representations about the existence of a contract
can be misleading where there is no intent to perform. See
Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S.
588, 596 (2001) (“To sell an option while secretly intending not to
(Continued on following page)
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Admittedly, a speaker may sometimes express a
genuine belief about a matter of present fact. An
opinion in these circumstances conveys uncertainty
or doubt as to the accuracy of the representation. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §538A (“A representation is one of opinion if it expresses only (a) the belief
of the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of
a fact”); see also W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser &
Keeton on Torts §109, at 755 (5th ed. 1984) (“Prosser
& Keeton”) (statement of opinion can “indicate[ ] some
doubt as to the speaker’s belief in the existence of a
state of facts”).
Where, however, the speaker possesses information establishing plain invalidity, the requisite uncertainty does not exist. Nor can the speaker create
uncertainty by adding the words “[w]e believe” to the
statement. As Justice Scalia reminded in Virginia
Bankshares, “not every sentence that has the word
‘opinion’ in it . . . leads us into this psychic thicket.
Sometimes such a sentence actually represents facts
as facts rather than opinions – and in that event no
more need be done than apply the normal rules for
§14(a) liability.” 501 U.S. 1108, 1109 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts §538A cmt. d
(“The form of the statement is not, however, controlling in all cases.”); Prosser & Keeton, at 755 (“It is
not, however, the form of the statement which is
permit the option’s exercise is misleading, because a buyer normally presumes good faith.”).
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important or controlling, but the sense in which it is
reasonably understood.”).
Allowing an issuer to escape liability for untrue
statements of present fact in a registration statement
by treating the statements as beliefs or opinions
contradicts the statutory framework set out in, and
policies underlying, Section 11 of the 1933 Act. See 15
U.S.C. §77k. In adopting the 1933 Act, Congress
sought to ensure that purchasers participating in a
public offering were fully informed of all facts material to the offering. See H.R. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1933) (“There is, however, an obligation upon
us to insist that every issue of new securities to be
sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by
full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”) (President’s message); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988)
(“The primary purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of material
information thought necessary to allow them to make
informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of securities in interstate commerce.”).
Congress advanced this goal by assigning to issuers a unique role in maintaining the accuracy of
the registration statement. To make out a prima facie
case under Section 11, purchasers must only “show a
material misstatement or omission” in an effective
registration statement. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S.
at 382. Evidence of the speaker’s state of mind is
not an element of such a claim. See Wagner v. First

14
Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.
2006) (“There is no state of mind element to a §11
claim . . . .”).
For insiders and underwriters, however, evidence
7
of falsity will generally not be enough. Although
these participants play a “direct role” in the offering
process, Section 11 provides a defense to an inaccurate registration statement. Herman & MacLean, 459
U.S. at 382. See also 15 U.S.C. §77k(a)(1-5). Congress
allows insiders and underwriters to escape liability
for misrepresentations or omissions of material fact
if they reasonably and actually “believe” that the
registration statement is accurate after a “reasonable
investigation, . . . ” 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3). See also
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 n. 26
(1976) (“Other individuals who sign the registration
statement, directors of the issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly are accorded a
complete defense against civil liability based on the
exercise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable
belief that the registration statement was not misleading.”).

7

See 77 Cong. Rec. 2934 (1933) (Statement by Rep. Chapman) (“Under the terms of this bill, the corporation itself is held
absolutely responsible, but its management, underwriters, and
so forth, are held only to the degree of responsibility above set
out. To have made them guarantors of such securities, as some
urged that they should be, would have worked an intolerable
hardship on many honest and responsible business men . . . .”).
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Issuers, however, are not allowed the same opportunity to avoid liability. Recognizing that the information in a registration statement is, for the most
part, within the unique control of issuers,8 Congress
gave issuers additional incentive to verify the accuracy of the registration statement by holding them
to a standard of liability that is “virtually absolute. . . .” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. Consistent with this intent, issuers are expressly denied
the right to defend against a misleading representation of material fact in a registration statement by
taking the position that they “believe” otherwise. See
15 U.S.C. §77k(b) (due diligence defense applicable to
those “other than the issuer”).9 As a result, issuers
can only avoid liability in a meaningful sense by ensuring the factual accuracy of the registration statement.10

8

See 77 Cong. Rec. 2914 (1933) (Statement of Rep. Greenwood) (“There is a peculiar fact with respect to such investments
in that the corporation that issues the securities knows more
about them than anyone else, and the old rule of caveat emptor,
or the buyer beware, certainly should not apply to this character
of investments. The man who sells them ought to give the facts,
and the Government ought to require the issuer of securities to
give all the facts, and be honest with the public.”).
9
The right to reasonable and actual belief in the accuracy
of the registration statement is commonly referred to as the “due
diligence” defense. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44
Brandeis L.J. 549, 554 (2006).
10
Other than the obligation to bring an action within the
statute of limitations, the only defense set out in the statute was
(Continued on following page)
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Allowing an issuer to treat facts in registration
statements as opinions or beliefs also introduces into
Section 11 what is effectively a state of mind requirement, at least where falsity is conditioned upon
a showing of subjective disbelief. Purchasers seeking
to establish a subjective disbelief as to facts in an
effective registration statement will be required to
produce evidence similar to what is needed to demonstrate scienter. See In re Credit Suisse First Boston
Corp. Analyst Reports Sec. Litig., 431 F.3d 36, 48
(1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he subjective aspect of the falsity
requirement and the scienter requirement essentially
merge; the scienter analysis is subsumed by the
analysis of subjective falsity.”). As a result, purchasers will no longer be able to set out a prima
facie case only by “show[ing] a material misstatement
or omission . . . .” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at
382.
In sum, an issuer possessing information showing that a representation of fact in a registration
statement is untrue or misleading cannot defend
against a claim of falsity by characterizing the statement as a belief or opinion. Such an approach does
not work an unnecessary hardship on issuers. While
it limits the ability to treat facts in a registration
statement as a belief or opinion, this approach does
not prevent the inclusion in the registration statement
of any suitably qualified representation of inherently
that the purchaser “knew of such untruth or omission . . . .” 17
U.S.C. §77k(a).

17
uncertain information, such as projections or other
forward-looking statements. See Rule 175, 17 C.F.R.
§230.175.
Moreover, issuers can avoid Section 11 liability
altogether to the extent the relevant disclosure does
not appear in the registration statement. See 15
U.S.C. §77k. In the absence of a duty to disclose, issuers may remain silent. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.
v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011) (noting
that antifraud provisions “do not create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information.”). See also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 239 n. 17 (“Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is
not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”). They also may,
under certain circumstances, disclose “information
the substance of which is not included in the registration statement” in a “free writing prospectus . . . .”
Rule 433, 17 C.F.R. §230.433; see also Rule 165,
17 C.F.R. §230.164. Information included in a
“free writing prospectus” is not subject to Section 11
liability.11

11

See Securities Offering Reform, Exchange Act Release No.
52056, 70 Fed. Reg. 4472, 44759 (Aug. 3, 2005) (“Even when
filed, a free writing prospectus will not be part of a registration
statement subject to liability under Securities Act Section 11,
unless the issuer elects to file it as a part of the registration
statement.”).
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II.

Virginia Bankshares Does Not Determine
the Standard of Review for a Statement of
Opinion that is Subjectively Believed

To the extent this Court treats the statement at
issue as an “opinion,” we do not agree that the appropriate standard for determining falsity is “answered”
by the decision in Virginia Bankshares. See Pet’r’s Br.
at 2. The Court in Virginia Bankshares expressly
“confine[d]” its analysis to cases involving subjective
disbelief. 501 U.S. at 1090 (“[W]e interpret the jury
verdict as finding that the directors’ statements of
belief and opinion were made with knowledge that
the directors did not hold the beliefs or opinions expressed, and we confine our discussion to statements
so made.”). The decision, therefore, left open the standard for determining the falsity of an opinion in the
absence of allegations of subjective disbelief.
Particularly in the commercial context, opinions
expressed by those with superior knowledge are understood to be more than a matter of pure speculation.12 See Prosser & Keeton, at 760-61 (“There is
quite general agreement that such an assertion is to
be implied where the defendant holds himself out or
is understood as having special knowledge of the matter which is not available to the plaintiff, so that his
opinion becomes in effect an assertion summarizing

12

Congress, in adopting Section 11, recognized the “peculiar
fact” that the corporation issuing the securities “knows more
about them than anyone else . . . .” See supra note 8.
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his knowledge.”) (footnote omitted). Instead, they must
be supported by a sufficient factual predicate. See
Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1093 (noting that
the opinions at issue were “reasonably understood to
rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate,
the absence of which renders them misleading.”); see
also Restatement (Second) of Torts §539 cmt. b (“The
statement of opinion may not only imply that the
maker knows of no fact incompatible with the opinion, but, when the circumstances justify it, may also
reasonably be understood to imply that he does know
facts sufficient to justify him in forming the opinion
and that the facts known to him do justify him.”).
This is particularly true where the opinion is, as
is the case here, expressly characterized as a belief. A
belief does more than articulate a subjective view or
uncertainty. It conveys “confidence” in the accuracy
of the statement. See 1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 213 (second definition of believe: “Put one’s
trust or have confidence in (or on) the truth of (a
proposition, doctrine, etc.), the efficacy or advisability
of (a principle, institution, practice, etc.), the existence of (a person or thing), the occurrence of (an
event)”). Confidence in turn suggests a “firm trust” in
the position. See id. at 483 (first definition of confidence: “Firm trust, reliance, faith in.” Fourth definition: “Assured expectation; the state of feeling certain
of.”). An expression of belief, therefore, indicates to
investors that the maker has a strong foundation for
the statement.
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The Government has, on brief in this case, asserted that an opinion can be false where it lacks “a
basis that is reasonable under the circumstances.”
Gov.’s Br. 6. We agree that this is an appropriate
standard for assessing whether an opinion has an
adequate foundation. Lower courts have routinely
applied the reasonable basis standard to statements
of belief and opinion. See Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849,
855 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc.,
857 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Helwig v. Vencor,
Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); In
re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 930 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 917 (1994). Likewise
the standard is commonly applied in the context of
forward-looking information. See Rule 175, 17 C.F.R.
§230.175 (safe harbor for forward-looking statements
that does not apply in the absence of a “reasonable
basis” for such statement).
An opinion or belief can also be false where the
maker possesses undisclosed facts that contradict the
accuracy of the statement. Such an understanding
is consistent with the Restatement of Torts, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §539(1) (statement of
opinion may be interpreted as “an implied statement
(a) that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with his opinion”), and the common law.
See Prosser & Keeton, at 760 (“[I]t has been recognized very often that the expression of an opinion
may carry with it an implied assertion, not only that
the speaker knows no facts which would preclude
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such an opinion, but that he does know facts which
justify it.”) (footnote omitted). See also Kimmell v.
Schaefer, 224 A.D.2d 217, 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st
Dep’t), aff ’d, 89 N.Y.2d 257 (1996) (“[W]here one
party does have superior knowledge, the expression
of an opinion implies that the declarant knows facts
which support that opinion and that he knows nothing which contradicts the statement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lower courts interpreting the federal securities
laws have recognized that a statement of belief can be
false under these circumstances. See Reese, 747 F.3d
at 579; City of Monroe Employees Retirement System
v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 675 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 936 (2005); see also Bissett v. PlyGem Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 142, 146 (11th Cir. 1976)
(“[A] plaintiff may recover upon a showing that the
defendant knew, or should have known, that the facts
in his possession invalidated the opinion which he
expressed.”). The Securities and Exchange Commission has expressed a similar position in the context
of forward-looking information. See Securities and
Exchange Commission, Br. as Amicus Curiae Filed
in Response to Ct. Order, 1, Slayton, et al. v. Am.
Express Co., et al., No. 08-5442-cv, 2d Cir. Jan. 21,
2010.
In addition to the standard for subjective disbelief set out in Virginia Bankshares, therefore, a
statement of opinion or belief can be false if it is

22
unsupported by a reasonable basis or the maker possesses undisclosed facts that contradict the accuracy
of the statement. Respondents in this case have
alleged that Petitioners were in possession of facts on
the effective date of the registration statement at
issue demonstrating that the contracts with pharmaceutical companies were not legally valid. Respondents, therefore, have sufficiently alleged that
the Petitioners’ statement was false when made or
omits to state facts necessary to make the statement,
in the light of the circumstances in which it was
made, not misleading.
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
In this case, Respondents have not challenged
the statement as to the validity of the contracts by
resorting to arguments that rely on the uncertainty
of the legal system.13 Their claims are not dependent
upon future changes in the law or the arguments of
“creative counsel.” They have alleged that the statement at issue was false “when made.” Complaint

13

To the extent addressing a statement that can be both
historical and dependent on future developments, courts in these
circumstances look to the way in which the plaintiffs have
framed the claim. See Spitzberg v. Houston Am. Energy Corp.,
No. 13-20519, 2014 WL 3442515, at *12 (5th Cir. July 15, 2014)
(although conceding that the term “reserve” may be “characterized as forward-looking” in some circumstances, plaintiffs’ allegations “focus on that component of the term . . . that had
already occurred”).
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¶47. The Complaint includes a number of allegations
designed to show that the contracts were not legally
valid on the effective date of the registration statement. See id. at ¶¶47-90. The Sixth Circuit found,
and we agree, that these allegations were sufficient to
establish falsity. See Ind. State Dist. Council of Laborers, 719 F.3d at 505-07.
For these reasons, amici respectfully urge this
Honorable Court to affirm the ruling of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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